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Abstract 
This paper uses the staggered adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for a difference-
in-difference identification of the impact of corporate governance on hedging. In a large 
panel of listed US firms, we focus on two indexes of the legally required governance 
reforms, but also a wide index of governance quality. We find that the substantial 
improvements in governance standards robustly lead to less foreign exchange exposure and 
more foreign exchange derivatives hedging, and that the economic magnitude of the effect is 
large. Also, the adoption of mandatory governance measures is a stronger predictor of 
hedging than voluntary improvements. Dynamic panel GMM estimates confirm a 
significant positive relationship between governance quality and hedging. 
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1.  Introduction 
The effect of good corporate governance on corporate hedging policies is ambiguous, both 
in theory and according to empirical studies. This paper attempts to make headway in 
studying the impact of corporate governance on foreign exchange risk management by using 
a large-scale natural experiment, the staggered adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act 
of 2002 and its sweeping governance changes on US listed companies. Applying a 
comprehensive metric of governance quality as well as subindexes that allow us to focus on 
governance changes induced by the legal reform, we find that improvements in governance 
robustly lead to less foreign exchange risk and more foreign exchange derivatives hedging, 
and that the level of adoption of required governance reforms is a stronger predictor of 
hedging than voluntary governance improvements. 
 
The ambiguity of the governance-hedging relationship is due to two popular but conflicting 
theory views. On one hand, theory suggests that reducing financial risks and expected costs 
of financial distress via hedging is in shareholders’ interest (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Myers, 1977; Leland, 1998). In this view, managers tend to 
hedge too little due to agency problems, and firms reduce corporate risk when exposed to 
more stringent governance rules. There is substantial empirical evidence to support this 
view, showing that managers hedge more when faced with better incentives and monitoring 
(Borokhovich,  Brunarski, Parrino, 2004; Géczy et al., 2007; Allayannis, Lel, Miller, 2012; 
Lel 2012; Bartram, 2015; Knopf, Nam and Thornton, 2002; Graham and Rogers, 2002). 
 
On closer inspection, however, things are more complex. In a starkly contrasting theory 
view, agency theories can also lead to the opposite prediction: when managers are 
imperfectly diversified or overly risk-averse and choose hedging policies to suit their own 
interests, they may ‘overhedge’ in the absence of oversight looking out for shareholders’ 
interests. Stronger governance will then lead to less hedging (Stulz 1984; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). There is again a body of evidence in support of this view (Tufano 1996; Huang, 
Peyer and and Segal, 2013).  
 
While the literature on the relationship between governance quality and corporate hedging is 
substantial, there has been almost no empirical work trying to use large-scale governance 
   
 
 
2 
 
reforms for the purposes of identification of the relationship between governance and 
hedging. The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, arguably the most sweeping reform of governance 
mandates worldwide in the past 30 years, presents a particular opportunity in this respect. 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to use comprenhensive measures of the 
governance changes induced by the SOX mandates to undertake a difference-in-difference 
study of the impact on corporate hedging.1  
 
In this paper, we ask whether the mandated transition to better governance in the SOX 
reform – with its differential and staggered impact on companies depending on their pre-
reform governance – is associated with more intensive management of foreign exchange 
risk. Using a balanced panel of 507 US non-financial firms over the period 2000 to 2007, we 
deploy a dual approach for the measurement of corporate hedging, by considering the 
exposure to foreign exchange rate movements as well as the use of FX derivatives. Foreign 
exchange exposure is appealing as it reflects all of the different instruments of corporate risk 
management, including financial and operational hedges, whereas derivatives constitute 
only a small portion of firms’ foreign exchange hedging. Foreign exchange exposure, 
however, is a black box: the observer is never quite sure whether an observed change in risk 
is the outcome of intentional risk management or due to different causes. Our derivatives 
use measure is meant to overcome this limitiation and to verify that any change in corporate 
risk is a deliberate policy. Our paper is one of the first to adopt this dual measurement.2  
                                                            
1  We are aware of only one other study that uses a limited set of SOX-related governance changes to examine 
their effect on risk management practices. Huang, Peyer and and Segal (2013) limit their investigation to board 
independence required by NYSE and NASDAQ and find weak evidence that companies required to increase 
the number of independent directors reduce their hedging. Their evidence is stronger for ‘high agency 
problem’ firms, defined as those with above-median CEO equity ownership, which the authors interpet as 
evidence in favour of board independence reducing overhedging. Our paper uses comprehensive measures of 
the SOX-induced governance changes, it looks at actual policy adoptions rather than pre-reform distance to the 
new rules, and it comes to different conclusions. 
2    Foreign exchange exposure is a well-established risk management measure in the international finance 
literature (e.g., Jorion, 1990; Dominguez and Tesar, 2006). It is attractive because it encompasses all effects of 
firms’ foreign exchange hedging of which derivatives constitute only a small part. Other foreign exchange risk 
management tools include exchange rate pass-through, the use of foreign currency debt, and various 
operational hedging techniques, including international operations that enhance firms’ operational flexibility 
and their capacity to manage exposures (see Section 2.2 for a literature review). Thus, foreign exchange 
exposure is a more comprehensive proxy of hedging activity than derivatives use, but it does not allow to 
distinguish between intentional risk management,  unintended side-effects, or cicumstances outside of 
corporate policies. Therefore, considering the use of derivatives as a second metric ensures that the observer 
captures intentional risk management choices. To the best of our knowledge, the only prior paper to use these 
dual measures to corporate hedging is Hutson and Laing (2014). 
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We use a comprehensive index of 41 measures describing the quality of corporate 
governance, GOV41. We find that foreign exchange exposure was smaller and the use of 
foreign exchange derivatives was greater for firms that adopted a better quality governance, 
as measured by a higher GOV41 index. This finding is consistent with the notion that a 
weak governance environment is associated with insufficient attention to risk management – 
rather than ‘overhedging’ by managers acting in their own interests – and that better 
governance is linked to a greater likelihood that the firm manages foreign exchange risk 
with derivatives.  
 
To tighten our identification, we decompose the wide GOV41 index into two different 
subindexes, with the goal of extracting a measure of exogenously triggered governance 
reforms: first, we consider the ten governance attributes that were rendered obligatory with 
the SOX reform, with a mandate to adopt them by 2004 at the latest (REG10). Second, we 
add ten other governance attributes to the ten mandatory REG10 attributes that were so 
intimately linked to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that their simultaneous adoption was highly 
likely; thus, we obtain an index of 20 governance measures, MANDATE-INDUCED, that 
allows a representative view of the actual govenance quality while maintaining a tight 
connection to the exogenous change in the law. There is a trade-off between a narrow 
measure that contains only mandated changes and a broader measure that better captures the 
governance reality, and our use of the two subindexes REG10 and MANDATE-INDUCED 
attempts to address this trade-off. Our key findings hold up well for our two subindexes 
reflecting the exogenous law change: the results remain highly significant for the restricted 
indexes MANDATE-INDUCED and REG10. We also find that the two subindexes have a 
stronger impact on hedging than their complements aggregating voluntary governance rules, 
the subsets among the 41 governance attributes that are not mandated by or linked to SOX. 
We find that the mandated changes wash out the effect of the voluntary complements when 
both are included simultaneously. These resuts are robust for both risk management metrics, 
FX exposure and FX derivatives use.  
 
The economic magnitude on hedging of the governance changes investigated in our study is 
substantial: according to our coefficient estimates, the median increase in GOV41 attributes 
that we observe in our sample between 2002 and 2007 leads to a 17.1% decrease in foreign 
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exchange exposure and a 14.8% increase in the probability of derivatives use, and the 
median increase in MANDATE-INDUCED (REG10) to a 14.9% (15.4%) decrease in foreign 
exchange exposure to a  8.0% (2.6%) increase in the probability of derivatives use amongst 
our sample firms. 
 
In further analysis and extensions, we create additional subindexes, the index BOARD based 
on 17 non-mandated board-related practices relating to the board of directors, and 
COMPENSATION, comprising 7 ‘good governance’ attributes regarding executive 
compensation and stock ownership. We find that both are significant but BOARD is 
associated with a stronger foreign exchange risk-reduction effect than COMPENSATION, 
suggesting that the role of boards is critical to improving foreign exchange risk 
management. Also, we use a time-trend analysis in which we interact our governance 
indexes with year dummies 2002-2006, deploying all seven indexes introduced so far, 
GOV41, the subindexes REG10 and MANDATE-INDUCED,  their complements GOV31 
and VOLUNTARY, as well as BOARD and COMPENSATION. We find that the fixed effect 
of each of our seven indexes remains  highly significant both on FX exposure and on the use 
of FX derivatives. Further, we find that the governance reforms have a lasting and even 
increasing impact on FX risk management, with a non-monotonic magnifying effect in the 
immediate years after the SOX reform: the strength of the governance-hedging relation is 
stronger in the initial years after SOX and then reverses back over time to the trend line. 
There is a subtle but clear difference between the use of derivatives and FX exposure: the 
stronger sensitivity effect of the use of FX derivatives is immediate, concentrated in 2002 
and thus before most of the SOX governance mandates were adopted, perhaps happening 
under the attention bias of corporate decision makers to the corporate fraud scandals of the 
time. By contrast, the stronger sensitivity to FX exposure follows the time trend of the 
adoption of the governance mandates for the entire 2002-2004 legal adoption period, decays 
much more slowly and exhibits a persistent effect throughout 2007.  
 
In final robustness tests, we re-estimate the exposure regressions using a dynamic panel 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The dynamic 
panel GMM approach has the potential to mitigate the endogeneity concerns that are rife in 
corporate governance research (Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012) and allows for the 
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possibility of a dynamic relation between explanatory and dependent variables. Using 
dynamic panel GMM, we find that six of our seven governance indexes remain negative and 
highly significant, with REG10 as the only exception.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly discusses the 
prior literature and hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data and methodology.  Section 4 
presents  summary statistics and univariate findings, and section 5 discusses our multivariate 
analysis. Section 6 provides concluding comments. 
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Hedging and corporate governance  
Corporate finance theory generally holds that hedging strategies reduce the volatility of 
future cash flows and hence will help to mitigate underinvestment, increase debt capacity, 
and reduce financial distress costs (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Myers, 1977; Froot, Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1993; Leland, 1998). Thus, there is broad consensus that the management of 
financial risks should be value-enhancing. There is also ample empirical evidence that 
hedging improves firm value (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Carter, Rogers and Simkins, 
2006; MacKay and Moeller, 2007; Disatnik, Duchin and Schmidt, 2014; Campello et al., 
2011; Bartram, Brown and Conrad, 2011).  
 
The modern corporation, however, is run by managers, and the impact of improved 
corporate governance on risk management depends on its effect on managerial decisions. 
This paper focuses on the relationship between hedging and corporate governance which 
can be understood as the set of rules and arrangements that address agency problems and 
ensure that corporate decision making is aligned with the interest of shareholders (and other 
relevant stakeholders).3 Thus, we limit our discussion to agency theories that explain how 
managers would in the presence of weak governance relative to the efficient hedging policy.  
 
In one view, managers hedge too little compared with the value-maximizing strategy. There 
is a variety of reasons why they will do so: managers could be short-termists and have 
                                                            
3 For this discussion, we consider that firm and shareholder value maximization coincide, that is we adopt an 
ex ante perspective where all ex post value transfers between equity, debt and other securities are anticipated. 
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career concerns while the benefits of hedging accrue in the long term; managers’s 
compensation may award them with a disproportionate stake in the upside, or they may be 
overconfident or be inattentive. When managers are inclined to hedge too little relative to 
shareholders’ interests, then better governance is associated with a greater use of derivatives 
for hedging purposes. There is substantial evidence in support of this view, looking at a 
variety of govenance mechanisms specifically. Borokhovich et al. (2004) report a positive 
relation between the monitoring of outside directors and the firm’s use of interest rate 
derivatives, and Lel (2012) finds that firms with strong corporate governance use derivatives 
to reduce risk and maximise firm value whereas those with weak governance use derivatives 
selectively to satisfy managerial self-interest. Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2012) show that 
hedging creates more value in firms with strong internal governance (such as those with a 
large outside blockholder) as well as better external governance. In firms with good 
governance, managers are less likely to use financial derivatives for speculative purposes 
(Géczy et al., 2007; Bartram, 2015). Hutson and Stevenson (2010) find, using a large 
international data set, that firms in countries with weak shareholder and creditor protection 
have higher exposure than firms in countries with a strong governance environment.  
 
In the contrasting view, however, managers, when left to their own devices, decide to 
‘overhedge’ relative to shareholders’ interest. The leading explanation is that they are 
underdiversified and hence overly risk averse (Stulz 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985), but 
excessive managerial risk aversion could have other roots. Stronger governance will align 
managers actions with shareholders’ interest and, thus, should lead to less hedging. Again 
there is a considerable body of evidence in support of this view (Tufano, 1996; Knopf, Nam 
and Thornton, 2002; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Kumar and Rabinovitch, 2013; Huang, 
Peyer and Segal, 2013). 
 
It is of course also possible that corporate hedging policies are already close to the efficient 
choices, either because agency problems are of minor relevance for risk management 
practices, or because the existing governance framework already leads to approximately 
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efficient decisions. In this case, standard microeconomic theory would predict that changes 
in governance rules have no impact on hedging policies.4  
 
Regarding the measurement of foreign exchange exposure and corporate hedging policies, 
there is an important literature showing that the management of foreign exchange exposure 
is complex as it involves not only a range of financial hedges (forwards, options, swaps, and 
foreign currency debt) but also operational hedging decisions that alter the firm’s real 
operations to reduce foreign exchange exposure (see Aretz and Bartram, 2010; Bartram and 
Bodnar, 2007; and Muller and Verschoor, 2006, for reviews). Operational hedges through 
the internationalization of operations are viewed as beneficial as they are associated with 
currency diversification, lead to currency matching of foreign exchange revenues with costs 
(Bodnar and Marston, 2002) and enhance operational flexibility when operations and 
suppliers are spread out in various parts of the world, creating  options for firms to manage 
risks, and to take advantage of international opportunities as they arise (Allen and Pantzalis, 
1996; Mello, Parsons and Triantis, 1995; Buckley and Casson, 1998; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 
1994; Pantzalis, Simkins and Laux, 2001; Carter, Pantzalis and Simkins, 2003). It is against 
the backdrop of this literature that we choose our dual measure of hedging policies: the 
foreign exchange exposure measure that encompasses all financial and operational hedges, 
as well as the derivative use variable that validates the intentional character of any observed 
changes in foreign currency risk.   
 
2.2 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its impact 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was an unprecendented policy overhaul in the US 
in reaction to a wave of fraud and accounting scandals in the early 2000s, the most 
emblematic ones engulfing Enron and WorldCom. The legislation included a number of 
stringent provisions, including on board composition, board oversight and compensation, 
intended to safeguard investors and to mitigate governance problems. The main thrust of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) mandates and associated revisions to NYSE and NASDAQ 
listing rules was to better align the incentives of corporate insiders with shareholders’ 
interests by strengthening internal corporate governance mechanisms. A salient feature of 
                                                            
4 Another theoretical possibility is that changes in the governance set-up push firm away from efficient 
hedging levels. We briefly discuss this possibility in Section 2.3.  
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was that it gave companies until November 2004 to comply 
with the mandatory policy changes. We exploit this element for the purposes of our 
identification strategy. 
 
The literature on the effects of the SOX legislation mostly asks whether the better 
governance had a measurable performance impact. The answer seems to be predominantly 
positive: On balance, the literature concludes that the SOX mandates have been value-
enhancing (e.g., Iliev, 2010; Dicks, 2012; Coates and Srinivasan, 2014). Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2007) study the announcement effects of the SOX reform and find that firms that 
were less compliant with the SOX mandates earned positive abnormal returns, and that the 
effect was concentrated in large firms. Aggarwal, Schloetzer and Williamson (2016) (ASW) 
ask whether the corporate governance mandates resulted in higher value for firms that had 
not been in compliance with the mandates before SOX. ASW gather data on 41 ‘good’ 
governance attributes, and we follow their index as our comprehensive measure of the 
adoption of governance reforms (GOV41). They identify ten governance attributes that were 
made obligatory with the SOX Act that we use (the REG10 index below) in addition to our 
wider measure MANDATE-INDUCED. ASW find that firms that had not adopted most of 
the mandated attributes pre-SOX experienced an increase in firm value after complying with 
the regulations, they document a substantial increase in the adoption of the 31 non-mandated 
governance practices, and show that this voluntary improvement in “governance culture” 
was associated with enhanced firm value. 
 
2.3 Summary of hypotheses  
The empirical investigation in this paper takes the theoretical and empirical controversy laid 
out in Section 2.1 as its starting point to understand how corporate govennance reform 
affects managerial decisions on risk management. Following the literature, we assume that 
corporate governance reform will strengthen the alignment of managerial decisions with 
shareholders’ interest. We summarize this literature discussion in three hypotheses:  
 
Underhedging hypothesis: When companies hedge too little prior to corporate governance 
reform compared with the firm optimum, improved corporate governance will lead to 
reduced foreign exchange exposure and to more hedging, as measured by derivatives use.  
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Overhedging hypothesis: When companies overhedge prior to corporate governance reform,  
improved governance will lead to more foreign exchange exposure and less hedging, as 
measured by derivates use.  
 
Efficient hedging hypothesis: When companies hedge approximately efficiently prior to 
reform, corporate governance should have no significant impact on exposure and hedging.  
 
From the perspective of relevant corporate finance theory, these three hypotheses are the 
leading contenders to explain the relationship between governance and hedging.  
 
Using the natural experiment of the SOX Act of 2002, we gather new evidence that 
contributes to arbiter between these hypotheses. Of course, identifying a causal relationship 
between governance reform and corporate hedging still leaves the door open for alternative 
interpretations, for example the possibility that the SOX reform did not contribute to a better 
alignment of managerial actions and shareholders’ interest. It is conceivable, for example, 
that managers hedge approximately efficiently (over overhedge), and that stricter 
governance rules distort risk management towards excessive hedging. This possibility, 
however, would imply that stricter governance destroys shareholder value, contradicting the 
bulk of empirical evidence, especially the evidence on the value effects of the Sarbanes-
Oxley reform that we survey in Section 2.2. However, we cannot dismiss this possibility 
outright. Thus, while our paper adds evidence helping to empirically discriminate between 
the leading agency theories on the governance-hedging nexus of efficient governance 
reforms, it cannot distinguish between efficient and inefficient governance reforms, or 
contribute to the discussion on the efficiency of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
3.  Data and methodology 
3.1 Data and measures of corporate hedging 
In our data gathering, we start with the Russell 1000 firms that were listed for the period 
2000-2007. We remove financial firms and REITs (which have unique governance 
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structures), leaving us with 786 remaining firms.5 Financial information – including stock 
price and financial statement data – is from Compustat and Datastream, and the governance 
data are drawn from RiskMetrics (formerly ISS). To gather data on foreign exchange 
derivatives use, we search 10-K filings for mentions of hedging activity using derivative 
instruments.6 Matching with the governance and control variables sourced from Compustat, 
Datastream and Riskmetrics yields a final sample of 507 firms. 
 
We use dual measures of coporate hedging policies. First, we estimate each firm’s annual 
Foreign exchange exposure, following the methodology and use by Jorion (1990), 
Dominguez and Tesar (2006), Hutson and Stevenson (2010), and others. We adopt this 
measure because of its popularity in the literature and the fact that it should encompass all 
unhedged exposure effects of FX movements. We use Jorion’s (1990) two-factor model that 
is estimated as follows: 
 
						ݎ௧௜ 		ൌ 		 ߙ଴௜ ൅ ߙଵ௜ܴ௧ ൅ ߙଶ௜ ݏ௧ ൅ ݁௧௜         (1) 
 
where rit is the log difference return on stock i, and Rt is the return on the benchmark stock 
index in time period t.  st is the log difference in the exchange rate over the same period, and 
eit is a random error term. To estimate equation (1), we use the firm’s closing stock price, the 
S&P 500 index, and the USD nominal trade weighted index (an increase in the index 
implies an appreciating US dollar relative to its trading partners’ currencies). We use weekly 
data to estimate exposure coefficients for each firm i for each year.  
 
We transform the exposure coefficients α i2  by taking their absolute value and then taking 
their square root. The former is necessary because foreign exchange exposure can be 
negative or positive, and we need an absolute rather than directional measure of exposure. 
We then take the square root because taking absolute values imposes truncation bias, which 
                                                            
5  We remove firms with two-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67 inclusive. This category includes depository and 
non-depository institutions, security and commodity brokers insurance carriers, insurance agents, brokers and 
services, real estate, holding and other investment offices. 
6  Item 7A in the 10-K report details the firm’s “Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk”. 
For example, the following excerpt is from pp. 40-41 of the 2007 10-K report for Abbott Laboratories. “Abbott 
enters into foreign currency forward exchange contracts to manage its exposure to foreign currency 
denominated intercompany loans and trade payables and third-party trade payables and receivables…..”.  
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results in non-normal error terms (Dominguez and Tesar, 2006; Hutson and Stevenson, 
2010). This leaves the error term normally distributed. 
 
As our second corporate hedging variable, we define the dummy Derivatives use, which 
takes a value of one if a firm hedges using foreign currency derivatives and zero otherwise.7 
Its use is meant to verify that changes in foreign exchange exposure are the consequence of 
deliberate hedging choices. 8 
  
3.2 Corporate governance measures 
We follow ASW and gather data on 41 ‘good’ corporate governance practices from 
Institutional Shareholder services (ISS).9 Among these 41 governance attributes, ASW 
identify 10 that are mandated by the SOX regulations and are included in the related 
revisions to NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards (REG10 subindex). They are: 
1. The Board must consist of majority independent directors. 
2. Non-management directors must have executive sessions without management. 
3. Nominating Committee must have only independent directors. 
4. Compensation Committee must have only independent directors. 
5. Audit Committee must have only independent directors and a minimum of three 
members. 
6. Firms must adopt corporate governance guidelines. 
7. Performance of the Board is reviewed regularly. 
8. Board approved succession plan is in place for CEO. 
9. Stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval. 
10. Consulting fee paid to auditors is less than audit fee paid to auditors. 
 
                                                            
7  We create the Derivative use dummy variable from a manual extraction of the annual reports between 2000 
to 2007 for the full sample of firms. Thus, Derivative use can vary annually based on the annual reports. 
8  We do not use firm fixed effects because they essentially remove all cross-sectional variation, and we expect 
cross-sectional variation in governance quality to be an important driver of our findings. See also Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991), Zhou (2001), Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008). 
9 Detailed definitions of each of the 41 attributes, and the breakdown in the subindexes REG10 and 
MANDATE-INDUCED, are contained in the Appendix. As discussed in ASW, complete one-to-one mapping 
between the ISS governance criteria and the SOX-related governance mandates is not possible. For instance, 
the ISS definition of independent director is more stringent than that mandated by regulation. Also, SOX 
regulations require only that firms adopt the provisions; ISS requires that they also be published. 
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We create REG10 using these 10 governance attributes,  following ASW; one point is added 
for each attribute. Firms had until their first annual meeting or no later than 15th November 
2004 to adopt these corporate governance regulations.10 We use the remaining 31 
governance attributes to create the GOV31 index.  
 
We then identify ten more governance attributes that, while not expressly made obligatory 
by the SOX Act, are so intimately tied to at at least one of the governance attributes in 
REG10 that the adoption of the obligatory SOX mandates most likely leads to the 
simultaneous adoption of these attributes as well. Indeed, their correlations with the REG10 
measures are very high. We call the ensuing index MANDATE-INDUCED: it includes the 
10 original mandates of REG10 as well as the 10 closely related attributes.11 We define the 
VOLUNTARY index as the complement of MANDATE-INDUCED, i.e. as the 21 remaining 
variables of GOV41. A correlation analysis of adoption (not reported in Tables but the 
correlation matrix in Table 5 gives a good impression) shows that MANDATE-INDUCED is 
a well chosen index, with the 10 addditional compoents being highly correlated with the 
components of REG10, and substantially less correlated with the components of 
VOLUNTARY.  
 
We introduce additional subindexes to measure the specific role of heightened board 
oversight and control of executive compensation. GOV31 consists of three sub-categories 
relating to (1) board (17 practices), (2) compensation and ownership (7 practises) (3) anti-
takeover (6 practises), and (4) audit (1 practice). We create sub-indexes for the first two of 
these sub-categories – which we call BOARD and COMPENSATION.12 These definitions 
provide us with 7 indexes in total, GOV41 and 6 subindexes.  
 
We also use the variable AFFECTED introduced by ASW that measures the initial distance 
(in 2002) between a firm’s governance standards and the 41 governance attributes in 
                                                            
10  Non-accelerated filers and foreign private issuers were to comply with the section 404 requirements for 
their first fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2005. 
11  The Appendix provides the full list of the 20 govenance attributes contained in MANDATE-INDUCED.  
12  As two out of the three audit attributes are mandated (and are therefore in REG10), we do not examine the 
audit sub-category. We also do not examine the anti-takeover sub-category because there was essentially no 
change during the sample period in our sample firms’ adoption of these attributes. The median number of 
adopted anti-takeover attributes is 2 (out of 6) throughout our sample period. 
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GOV41; thus, AFFECTED does not take account of actual adoptions, but only their putative 
need for reform, as measured by distance. However, as our data show, the depth and pace of 
adoption of both mandated and voluntary governance changes vary widely, even among 
firms with similar initial needs for reform. ASW (as well as Huang, Peyer and Segal, 2013) 
use only this measure of initial distance. Our study takes the complementary view that 
actual implementations are probably a more reliable and precise measure of firms’s current 
governance situation that their putative need AFFECTED dummy for the sake of 
comparison. Thus, we deploy in total 8 governance metrics,  ASW’s AFFECTED variable 
on the initial 2002 distance to high-quality governance, and the seven measures of actual 
adoptions of new governance practices laid out above.  
 
As the ISS database provides consistent data on these attributes only from 2002 onwards, 
our governance indexes start in 2002; we follow ASW in using the 2002 data also for the 
two previous years. In order to readily compare our results using the different indexes, we 
express all indexes as percentages. For example, if firms had adopted all 41 governance 
attributes of the GOV41 index, the firm scores 100 percent on this particular index. 
 
3.3 Firm characteristics and control variables 
It is essential to control for a wide set of firm characteristics that mat influence the 
governance-risk management relationship. We use several firm characteristics that have 
been commonly used in prior exchange rate exposure studies as control variables: firm size 
as measured by total assets (Assets), market-to-book value of equity (MTB), the quick ratio 
(Quick), R&D expense as a proportion of sales (R&D), the debt-to-assets ratio (D/A). These 
data are annual. We control for industry using two-digit SIC codes. In the exposure 
regressions, we also control for the use of derivatives using Derivatives use dummy. 
 
In particular, we need to include measures of firms’ exposure to international markets and to 
exchange rate risk. Importantly, we always include a measure of foreign sales as a 
proportion of total sales (Foreign sales). Unfortunately, limitations in reporting make it 
impossible to break down foreign sales by country or region, and hence to refine the foreign 
exchange exposure estimate by geographies and currencies. In addition, we control for the 
international diversification of a firm’s operations and the extent of its operational hedging 
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by using the multinationality classification system of Aggarwal, Berrill, Hutson and 
Kearney (2011) (ABHK). The ABHK classification system divides the world into six 
regions based on the inhabited continents: Africa, Asia, Europe, North America (including 
Central America), South America, and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific 
islands). A firm with activities entirely within its home country is defined as domestic (D), 
and a firm activities in the region in which it is headquartered (beyond its own country) is 
referred to as regional (R).  If a firm has activities in more than one region (but not fully 
global) it is defined as trans-regional (T), and this category is further subdivided into T2 
(two regions), T3 (three regions), T4 (four regions) and T5 (five regions).  A ‘global’ (G) 
firm has activities in all six regions. A firm is considered by ABHK to have a presence in a 
particular region if it has at least one activity there. The ‘activity’ we use is subsidiaries. 
Data on subsidiary location were hand-collected for each year from the Directory of 
Corporate Affiliates via Lexis Nexis. Subsidiaries data is the best available measure of 
international reach, as the Directory of Corporate Affiliates provides the address of each 
firm’s subsidiaries.13 The ABHK classification scheme is operationalised by assigning a 
value of 1 to domestic (D) firms, 2 to regional (R) firms, 3, 4, 5 and 6 to T2, T3, T4 and T5 
firms respectively, and 7 to global (G) firms. As there may be a nonlinear relation between 
multinationality and derivatives use as well as between multinationality and foreign 
exchange exposure (Hutson and Laing, 2014), we include squared ABHK terms in all 
regressions. 
 
The effectiveness of corporate governance reform may also depend on CEO characteristics 
and incentives. To address this possibility, we use several variables measuring CEO 
characteristics and CEO incentives, namely CEO tenure, the equity and option holdings of 
the CEO, and CEO duality (the chairman and CEO positions held by the same person) that 
we obtain from the ExecuComp database (variables used in robustness tests reported in an 
Internet Appendix). 
 
3.4 Identification 
                                                            
13  This is in contrast to annual report data on firms’ foreign sales and assets. SFAS 131 gives firms 
considerable latitude when reporting data on geographic business segments. Each firm reports their foreign 
activity differently, and at various levels of granularity. Some firms are quite specific on the countries in which 
they operate, and others are more vague. 
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A powerful feature of our data is that the actual adoption of the governance mandates 
contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is staggered, and so for two reasons: first, the 
SOX Act of 2002 left companies with a choice during a two-year transition period, until 
November 2004. Second, a substantial number of companies had not adopted all required 
measures by the November 2004 deadline but did so in subsequent years, thus allowing to 
observe staggered adoptions during a longer time window; as one would expect, the 
adoption of voluntary governance attributes is slower than that of the mandated ones (see 
Table 1.)  
 
We use this staggered adoption of the mandatory changes in governance attributes as the 
backdrop for our difference-in-difference identification in our balanced panel analysis for 
the 2000-2007 period. In each regression using a specific governance index as independent 
variable of interest, we focus on the actual adoption and approval of governance attributes.14  
That is, each change in component i in year t of the governance index puts the firms with the 
recorded change in component i in year t in the treated sample, whereas firms with no 
change in component i in year t are in the control sample for that component and year.  
 
We first consider the wide GOV41 index, and then consider the two parallel subindexes of 
law-induced governance changes,  REG10 limited to the obligatory measures prescribed in 
the SOX legislation, and MANDATE-INDUCED containing an additional 10 attributes. In 
addition, we use ASW’s AFFECTED variable capturing the initial distance between a firm’s 
governance standards and the 41 attributes of GOV41 but ignoring actual adoptions. 
 
4. Summary statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1 presents the mean, median and standard deviation by year (2002-2007) for the 
comprehensive governance index GOV41, as well two breakdowns of the 41 governance 
measures in GOV41: the first breakdown by MANDATE-INDUCED (20 measures in tight 
association with the SOX-mandated changes) vs. VOLUNTARY (the remaining 21 
measures), the second by REG10 (the 10 SOX-mandated measures) vs. GOV31 (31 
measures). Table 1 also shows for each variable the median values of these indexes for 
                                                            
14  Our indexes are in contrast to Aggarwal, Schloetzer, and Williamson (2015) and Huang, Peyer and Segal 
(2013) who ignore actual adoptions and focus only on the initial distance to the newly requird governance 
framework. We also use ASW’s AFFECTED dummy for the sake of comparison. 
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small and large firms, defined as those with less than and greater than the median overall 
median asset value of $1,374.2 million. Column (7) presents the percentage change in each 
index’s value between 2002 to 2007, and in column (8) we present results for t-tests for 
difference in means and Wilcoxon rank sum z-statistics for difference in medians for the 
governance indexes between 2002 and 2007. Column (9) displays the Wilcoxon rank sum z-
statistic for the difference in medians for small versus large firms. 
 
There was a significant rise in all of those indexes over time as the firms worked towards 
compliance with the mandates. GOV41, MANDATE-INDUCED, and REG10 doubled in the 
number of adoptions, both in means and medians. REG10 shows the strongest increase in 
means, an increase of 140 percent from 3.4 in 2002 to 8.1 in 2007, and medans increase 
threefold. GOV31 has the smallest increase, by only 70% (mean) to 80% (meadian). All 
increases between 2002 and 2007 are highly significant (p-values < 0.01). Interestingly, the 
bulk of the increase in levels in REG10 is accomplished by 2005 (in line with the legal 
deadline of 2004 imposed by the SOX Act), and the same pattern is true for MANDATE-
INDUCED. By contrast, the adoption of various measures in the VOLUNTARY subindex 
were slower and continued until 2007. These panel inspections of means and medians 
provide additional insights that our breakdowns are meaningful. Looking at the median 
values of  Large vs Small firms, there does not appear to be a clear difference in the 
adoption of GOV41 or any of the breakdown variables, in either direction. Looking at the 
evolution in means (not reported in tables), we find that large firms had significantly greater 
compliance with the mandates (MANDATE-INDUCED and REG10) than small firms, and 
large firms had also adopted more of the non-mandated attributes (VOLUNTARY and 
GOV31). This difference might be expected given the evidence on the costs of compliance 
for small firms (Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008, and Iliev, 2010). We also find, confirming 
ASW in this regard, that the mean differences in compliance between large and small firms 
– as well as the adoption of non-mandated governance attributes – persist after 2004. 
 
Table 2 presents summary information on the firms’ use of foreign currency derivatives 
over the period 2000-2007. For each of our first five indexes, we break down the use of 
derivatives by firms below and above the median of the index, respectively. In Panel A, we  
consider first the comprehensive GOV41 index, before breaking it down by MANDATE-
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INDUCED and VOLUNTARY; Panel B shows the breakdown by REG10 vs. GOV 31. It is 
clear from Panel A that firms with strong compliance with governance mandates – as 
proxied by above-median index values for GOV41, MANDATE-INDUCED, and REG10 – 
have significantly higher financial derivative use. In all cases, the usage difference between 
fims above and below the governance index in question is strongly significant for the three 
indexes, and this is particular strong – highly significant in almost all years with – for the 
two indexes built around mandated governance changes REG 10 and MANDATE-
INDUCED. By contrast, the difference in usage is the opposite for the two governance 
indexes containing only voluntary adoptions, providing a strong case that the distinction 
between MANDATE-INDUCED vs. VOLUNTARY and REG10 vs. GOV31 is economically  
meaningful. Interestingly, the derivatives use counter seem to be slightly decreasing for 
firms with below median adoption rates, but increases for the above-median adoption.  
 
In Panel C we report the overall proportion of firms using derivatives, this time broken 
down by Small v. Large firms. Consistent with the risk management literature, we find that 
small firms are significantly less likely to use currency derivatives than large firms (Bodnar 
and Wong, 2003; Chow, Lee and Solt, 1997; Dominguez and Tesar, 2006; Hutson and 
Stevenson, 2010). 
 
We recall that there are several weaknesses associated with the derivatives use metric. The 
first – that firms may speculate rather than hedge with derivatives – we have addressed via 
careful searches of firms’ 10-Ks (as described in Section 3). The second and most salient is 
that the dummy provides no indication of the extent of firms’ derivative hedging activities. 
If a firm had improved its derivative hedging activities by, for example, ceasing to 
selectively or partially hedge foreign currency transactions, this would not show up in the 
data. Thus, while the average use of foreign exchange derivatives changes changes little 
over time over the key 2002 to 2007 period (from 0.40 to 0.42), this does not necessarily 
imply that the managers of our sample firms fail to improve their derivatives hedging 
programs during the period.  
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the sample firms’ median absolute exposure for each 
year; that is, the absolute value of αi2 estimated via equation (1). We also present, for the full 
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sample, the proportion of the exposure coefficients found to be significant at the 5 percent 
level or better. The structure of Table 3 replicates that of Table 2. In Panel A and Panel B, 
where we distinguish according to high and low values of the first five indexes, we find that 
median levels of foreign exchange exposure are generally lower for firms with stronger 
governance. But while this difference is strong for MANDATE-INDUCED, it is substantially 
weaker for VOLUNTARY, whereas no such difference is discernible for the breakdown 
between REG10 and GOV31. This difference is significant (at standard levels) for REG10, 
however, in only two of the years. For GOV31, better-governed firms have significantly 
lower exposure in 4 of the 8 years. Panel C presents median exposures for small and large 
firms. The exposure of small firms exceeds that of large firms, and so in every year of the 
observation period, as expected based on earlier literature (Chow et al., 1997; Bodnar and 
Wong, 2003; Dominguez and Tesar, 2006).  
  
In Table 4, we present median values for the control variables, for the three indexes GOV41, 
MANDATE-INDUCED, and VOLUNTARY. As anticipated, firms with above-median 
adoption of governance attributes are larger and have a higher valuation (M/B ratios) than 
below-median firms. However, no clear pattern exists regarding leverage (variable D/A) and 
the ABHK multinationality measures. Low-governance index firms also have significantly 
higher R&D expense ratios and quick ratios than high-governance firms. We find similar 
differences for the other indexes (not reported in tables). 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the full set of variables used in the multivariate 
analysis. The tabulation provides validation of our two decompositions of the 41 governance 
attributes in the GOV41 index. Unsurprisingly, GOV41 is strongly correlated with all the six 
subindexes that are constructed from its components. However, whereas the obligatory 
measures in REG10 are almost perfectly correlated with MANDATE-INDUCED (ρ=0.91), 
the correlation is only half as strong with VOLUNTARY; the pattern is similar for GOV31. 
While our indexes of mandated and mandate-induced actual adoptions (REG 10 and 
MANDATE-INDUCED) or significantly correlated with the AFFECTED dummy of pre-
reform distance to the mandates, these correlations are an order of magnitude weaker than 
those with GOV41. our Table 5 also shows that our As expected, there is a strong and 
significant positive correlation between firm size as measured by total assets and the seven 
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governance indexes we use. FX exposure is strongly negatively correlated with all seven 
indexes, with the lowest correlation for REG10. The use of derivatives is significantly 
positively correlated with all index variables except for VOLUNTARY. Table 5 reveals little 
to be concerned about regarding multicollinearity, with the possible exception of R&D and 
the quick ratio, which have a Spearman rank correlation of 0.55.  However, all variables 
have a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of less than two. 
 
5. Multivariate analysis 
5.1  Panel analysis of the time variations in governance quality  
Table 6 presents the findings for our first main set of panel logistic regressions, with foreign 
exchange exposure, or more precisely the square root of the absolute exposure coefficient 
(√|αi2|, with αi2 estimated according to equation (1)) being used as the dependent variable. In 
column (1) we examine the effect of the comprehensive GOV41 index. We find that 
governance quality, as measured by these broad dimensions of governance practices, are 
strongly correlated with foreign exchange exposure, significant at the 1%-level. This is the 
first central result of the paper.  
 
For the control variables, we find that larger firms are more likely to use derivatives, and 
that firms with a higher market value relative to book are less likely to use derivatives. As 
expected, firms with a greater proportion of sales abroad are more likely to hedge with 
foreign exchange derivatives. We also find the expected inverse U-shaped relation between 
derivatives use and the extent of multinationality.15  
 
We further address concerns governance and hedging could be jointly driven by 
unobservable determinants by focusing on subindexes that represents the exogenously 
imposed governance mandates. Therefore, in columns (2) and (3) we decompose GOV41 
into the MANDATE-INDUCED index of 20 attributes, and the VOLUNTARY index for the 
remaining 21 attributes. When using MANDATE-INDUCED as the governance index, we 
find that the variables of interest remain strongly significant  at the 1%-level (column (2)). 
                                                            
15 We lose about 15% of observations because of missing vaues for the ABHK variable. When we repeat all 
our analyses using the number of foreign subsidiaries as the proxy for the extent of operational hedging (rather 
than ABHK), our findings are essentially unchanged.  
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By contrast, the complementary VOLUNTARY index measuring non-mandated 
improvements in governance is not significant (column (3)). When we include both the 
MANDATE-INDUCED and the VOLUNTARY subindex in the same regression, a rather 
telling result emerges: the MANDATORY subindex remains highly significant at the 1%-
level with a practically unchanged coefficient, whereas the VOLUNTARY subindex remains 
insignificant and further decreases in value (column (4)). The second partition of the 
comprehensive governance measures in the legally mandated governance subindex REG10 
and the voluntary complement GOV31 provides comparable results: both the REG10 index 
and its voluntary complement GOV31 are significant at the 5%-level (columns (5) and (6)). 
But when we include both REG10 and GOV31 in the same regression, we find again that 
only REG10 is significant (p = 0.09) whereas GOV31 becomes insignificant. BOARD and 
COMPENSATION also show a significant impact on the derivatives use, albeit at weaker 
level, and ASW’s AFFECTED dummy also shows significance (p = 0.023).  
 
Table 7 shows the impact on the second hedging measure, derivatives use, presented in 
exactly the same format as in Table 6. In column (1), we find that the broad measure of 
governance quality GOV41 is strongly correlated with derivatives use, significant at the 1%-
level, complementing our first main result above. When using MANDATE-INDUCED and 
VOLUNTARY instead, the variables of interest remain strongly significant (regressions (2) 
and (3)). When we include both the MANDATE-INDUCED and the VOLUNTARY subindex 
in the same regression (4), the same clear-cut result that we had seen for foreign exchange 
exposure obtains: only the mandatory component is highly significant, whereas the 
voluntary component no longer is. The second breakdown of the comprehensive governance 
measures in the legally mandated governance subindex REG10 and the voluntary 
complement GOV31 provides the same result: we find that the significance of REG10 is 
much stronger in the joint regression (7). BOARD and COMPENSATION are also 
significant, whereas ASW’s variable AFFECTED no longer is. 
 
In conclusion of our baseline regression results, we find that the mandated governance 
changes measured by MANDATE-INDUCED and REG10 significantly reduce foreign 
exchange exposure and symmetrically increase the use of foreign exchange derivatives. In 
addition, there is a clear differential impact of mandated and voluntary governance changes 
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on hedging, with mandated changes producing stronger and robust effects.  These are two of 
the key fidings of the paper, in particular the significant impact of governance reform when 
we restrict the observation to exogenous variations in governance quality.  
 
5.2  Extensions 
 
Table 8 contains our first set of extensions, where we repeat the main analysis both for small 
and for large firms (firms below and above median by asset size, respectively). Panel A 
looks at derivatives use, Panel B at foreign exchange exposure. Small firms tend to be more 
exposed to exchange rate movements than large, and an important explanation for this is 
that small firms are less likely to hedge because of the high fixed costs associated with 
implementing effective hedging programs (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston 1996, 1998; Bodnar 
et al., 1995; Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; 
Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). For small firms, therefore, better governance may not have as 
strong an effect on risk management as it has for large firms. Our findings show that the 
significance of the comprehensive GOV41 measure for small and large firms alike are 
confirmed, albeit with weaker significance especially when it come to derivatives use. But 
when we look at the subindexes, we find that large firms seem to be reacting more clearly to 
MANDATE-INDUCED government measures, whereas small firms react more to the 
measures in the VOLUNTARY subindex. We find the same pattern when looking at the 
decomposition into the REG10 and GOV31 subindexes. These results are consistent with the 
views that small firms face higher hedging costs. It is, however, somewhat surprising that 
small firms’ hedging and risk management appears to be more affected by a voluntary 
change in governance practices than by a legally mandated change, and that the opposite is 
true for large firms. The results seem to confirm, though, that our earlier results in Tables 6 
and 7 that show a clearly distinct reaction to MANDATE-INDUCED (REG10) and 
VOLUNTARY (GOV31) are not driven by small firms.  
 
In the second extension, we add a time trend variable16 in which we interact each of our 
seven governance indexes with year dummies 2002 to 2006 (Table 9). Panel A of Table 9 
                                                            
16 This approach is informed by Aggarwal, Schloetzer and Williamson (2016), who define firms affected by 
the mandates as those that had adhered to 3 or fewer of the REG10 attributes in 2001. Because of the 
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regresses the FX exposure variable, whereas Panel B considers the derivatives use. The first 
term in each column has no time interaction and therefore indicates the time-invariant effect 
of the governance index, whereas the following terms capture the year-specific sensitivity of 
the governance index.  
 
In Panel A of Table 9, where we consider the impact on foreign exchange exposure, the 
time-invariant effect is highly significant in all case except for the COMPENSATION index. 
The year-specific effects show a strong additional impact that slowly rises to about double 
the time-invariant impact two years after the adoption of the law before falling back again. 
As can be seen in all columns of Panel A, the strongest foreign exchange risk-reduction 
effect of the mandates occurs around the 2004 – the year of the mandates’ deadline – before 
the interaction term coefficients decline in an absolute sense. Thus, overall there appears to 
emerge a hump-shaped reaction of FX exposure to the governance measures; it seems that 
the impact of better governance on overall FX exposure is persistent but takes more time to 
deploy, and hence is increasing over a number of years.  
 
In Panel B of Table 9, where derivatives use is the dependent variable, we find a different 
time pattern. As in Panel A, we uncover a highly significant impact of the time-invariant 
component for each of the seven governance indexes (p < 0.01 in all cases except for the 
COMPENSATION index where p = 0.011). The time-variant patterns, however, exhibit a 
much more shortlived nature. We find a stronger effect of the governance index on 
derivatives use only in 2002, the year of adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in which the 
novelty of the reform and the awareness of recent corporate fraud cases were strong, and a 
quick reversal to the normal sensitivity in all subsequent years. Thus, we find a heightened 
sensitivity that is very temporary in nature, consistent perhaps with initial attention-induced 
overshooting.  
 
Another extension that we investigate is the possibility that the effectiveness of corporate 
governance reform depends on CEO characteristics. To address this possibility, we include 
four variables of CEO characteristics and CEO incentives (CEO tenure, CEO equity, CEO 
options, and CEO duality) in the regressionset-up of Tables 6 and 7. The results show that 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
inherently arbitrary nature of selecting the cutoff, we instead interact the indexes REG10 and GOV31 with year 
dummies. 
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our results are not altered when these CEO variables are included (the tests and correlations 
are reported in an Internet Appendix). 
 
5.3  Additional  Endogeneity Tests 
 
In this section, we re-estimate our exposure regressions using a dynamic panel generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Table 10 displays our 
results for the effects of the seven indexes on foreign exchange exposure. We find strong 
and highly significant results for all governance indexes except for REG10; the six other 
indexes remain highly significant.17 Given the advantages of the dynamic panel GMM 
approach over standard panel regressions, these are reassuring results that indicate that a rise 
in the adoption of governance attributes leads to better risk management in US firms, albeit 
with weaker result than in our original estimation equation. Also, the effect seems to hold by 
and large when we focus on exogenous, law-induced subindexes of governance changes. 
We redo the same regressions with derivatives use as the dependent variable and find no 
significant effect (not reported in tables). Overall, these findings confirm our conclusion that 
the implementation of the SOX mandates and related listing rules contributed to 
substantially lower foreign exchange risk for US firms. 
 
As an aside, we find a much stronger relation between BOARD and exposure than 
COMPENSATION and exposure. This suggests that the monitoring role of the board may be 
more critical in ensuring best practice risk management than compensation-related attributes 
designed to align managers’ with shareholders’ interests. Alternatively, it may be the case 
that the effects of executive compensation would be better proxied by more direct measures 
of compensation contracts and their changes over time, as in Géczy et al. (1997), Gay and 
Nam (1998), Kumar and Rabinovich (2013) and Bakke et al. (2016). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Following the corporate governance scandals of the early 2000s, the strong regulatory 
response in the form of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act was accompanied by a wave of 
investor sentiment demanding better governance standards in listed firms that led to 
                                                            
17  Dyamic panel GMM cannot be applied to the AFFECTED dummy since it is time-invariant. 
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stringent regulation, providing a hitherto little explored opportunity to strengthen the 
identification of the governance-hegding relation. In this paper, we use this exogenous 
shock to investigate the effect of cororate governance quality on firms’ risk management 
relating to foreign exchange risk. Using a sample of 507 US firms over the period 2000-
2007, we examine the relation between indexes of ‘good governance’ attributes and the 
sample firms’ use of currency derivatives for hedging purposes, and their exposure to 
exchange rate movements. We use a comprehensive variable of 41 governance practices 
(GOV41), we find a strong and robust risk-reduction effect of better governance, consistent 
with the hypothesis that firms tend to hedge too little on average when managerial discretion 
is not checked by effective governance mechanisms.  
 
To address concerns about the endogeneity of the link between governance rules and 
hedging policies, we focus on governance changes mandated or induced by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). We propose two measures of panel variation in governance 
standards that are directly driven by the mandatory improvements in governance imposed by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: we use an index of governance attributes that were directly made 
mandatory by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with a two year transition period to execute 
the mandatory changes (REG10), and a somewhat larger index of measures that, beyond the 
10 included in REG10, also include 10 measures that are usually adopted in tandem with the 
mandatory changes (MANDATE-INDUCED). We contrast these indexes with their 
complements of  voluntary governance practices (GOV31 and MANDATE-INDUCED). For 
both index splits, we find robust and highly significant results, and find that the subindexes 
based on mandated governance changes have a stronger impact than the indexes comprising 
voluntary governance improvements. As further test to allay endogeneity concerns, we 
employ dynamic panel GMM and find strong confirmation for our result on foreign 
exchange exposure. Overall, our findings suggest that the exogenous SOX reform in 
governance norms resulted in companies strengthening their foreign exchange risk 
management practices, thus sheding new light on still ambiguous body of work on the 
relationship between good governance and managers’ hedging of financial risks.  
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Table 1 Corporate governance index values over time 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
  2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 % change          2002 - 2007 
T-test /rank sum 
test 
Rank sum test, 
small vs large 
GOV41 
Mean 13.05 18.91 20.74 24.45 24.25 25.81 98 54.56*** 18.32*** 
Median 13.00 19.00 21.00 25.00 25.00 26.00 100 28.27*** 
Standard deviation 4.01 3.58 3.55 3.86 3.79 3.76 
Small firm median 14.00 20.00 22.00 26.00 26.00 27.00 
Large firm median 13.00 17.00 19.50 23.00 23.00 24.00 
MANDATE-INDUCED  
Mean 7.53 10.21 11.76 14.77 14.47 14.63 94 45.29*** 19.70*** 
Median 8.00 10.00 12.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 88 26.64*** 
Standard deviation 2.74 2.39 2.41 2.78 2.51 2.46 
Small firm median 8.00 11.00 13.00 16.00 16.00 16.00 
Large firm median 7.00 9.00 11.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 
VOLUNTARY 
Mean 5.52 8.70 8.98 9.68 9.79 11.18 103 45.66*** 12.50*** 
Median 6.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 11.00 83 27.77*** 
Standard deviation 1.98 2.11 2.01 2.08 2.16 2.14 
Small firm median 6.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 11.00 
Large firm median 5.00 8.00 8.50 9.00 9.00 10.00 
REG10 
Mean  3.38 4.38 4.77 7.79 8.07 8.12   140 52.80*** 12.57  *** 
Median 3.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 200 27.02*** 
Standard deviation 1.51 1.54 1.56 1.71 1.53 1.43 
Small firm median 3.00 4.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
Large firm median 4.00 5.00 5.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 
GOV31 
Mean 10.34 14.54 15.97 16.65 16.18 17.69 71 47.35*** 15.96*** 
Median 10.00 15.00 16.00 17.00 16.00 18.00 80 27.26*** 
Standard deviation 1.92 3.02 2.80 2.95 2.98 3.03 
Small firm median 10.00 13.00 15.00 16.00 15.00 16.00 
Large firm median 11.00 15.50 17.00 18.00 17.00 18.00 
BOARD  
Mean 0.28 0.46 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.56 99 46.69*** 12.54*** 
Median 0.29 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.53 80 27.91*** 
Standard deviation 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 
Small firm median 0.29 0.41 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.53 
Large firm median 0.29 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.59 
COMPENSATION  
Mean 0.42 0.51 0.56 0.63 0.64 0.68 63 23.19*** 24.47*** 
Median 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.71 67 19.63*** 
Standard deviation 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.21 
Small firm median 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Large firm median 0.43 0.57 0.57 0.71 0.71 0.86 
Notes: In this table, we present the mean, median and standard deviation for the REG10, GOV31, BOARD and COMPENSATION governance indexes respectively for each year 2002-2007. Column (7) shows the percentage change 
in the governance indexes to 2007 from 2002. Column (8) presents the t-statistic and Wilcoxon rank sum z-statistic for the test of difference between mean and median values of the governance indexes in 2007 relative to 2002. 
Column (9) displays the Wilcoxon rank sum z-statistic for the test of overall difference in medians between small and large firms. Small (large) firms are classified as having total assets less than or equal to (greater than) the overall 
median value of $1,374.2 million. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The governance variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 2 Proportion of derivative usage by governance over time  
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Year  Low GOV41 High GOV41 Z-statistic  
Low                 
MANDATE-
INDUCED 
High                
MANDATE-
INDUCED 
Z-
statistic  
Low 
VOLUNTARY 
High 
VOLUNTARY Z-statistic 
2000 0.3 0.38 -0.78 0.29 0.45 -1.99** 0.31 0.24 0.71 
2001 0.35 0.48 -1.17 0.34 0.55 -2.62*** 0.36 0.32 0.39 
2002 0.39 0.57 -1.66* 0.38 0.61 -2.70*** 0.4 0.4 -0.02 
2003 0.29 0.41 -3.04*** 0.29 0.44 -3.34*** 0.32 0.36 -1.09 
2004 0.28 0.44 -3.86*** 0.29 0.45 -3.75*** 0.34 0.42 -1.77* 
2005 0.12 0.43 -4.66*** 0.2 0.42 -3.47*** 0.31 0.44 -2.87*** 
2006 0.27 0.42 -2.33** 0.31 0.41 -1.63 0.34 0.43 -2.06** 
2007 0.22 0.43 -2.48** 0.25 0.44 -2.81*** 0.32 0.43 -1.57 
Panel B 
Year Low REG10 High REG10 Z-statistic  LOW GOV31 High GOV31 
Z-
statistic  Low BOARD High BOARD Z-statistic 
2000 0.29 0.49 -2.73*** 0.31 0.15 1.19 0.304 0.304 0.00 
2001 0.34 0.58 -3.20*** 0.36 0.23 0.96 0.352 0.393 -0.60 
2002 0.38 0.55 -2.51*** 0.41 0.31 1.31 0.396 0.411 -0.21 
2003 0.32 0.46 -2.57*** 0.25 0.43 -4.47*** 0.214 0.383 -3.63*** 
2004 0.35 0.46 -2.37** 0.28 0.43 -3.48*** 0.268 0.395 -1.60 
2005 0.21 0.44 -4.64*** 0.27 0.43 -3.34*** 0.170 0.415 -3.28***  
2006 0.3 0.42 -1.86* 0.29 0.44 -3.31*** 0.310 0.416 -1.85*  
2007 0.26 0.44 -2.63*** 0.29 0.45 -2.73*** 0.211 0.427 -1.88*  
Panel C 
 
Low 
COMPENSATION 
High 
COMPENSATION Z-statistic AFFECTED NON-AFFECTED 
Z-
statistic All Firms Small Firms 
Large 
Firms Z-statistic 
2000 0.29 0.54 -3.37*** 0.24 0.38 3.62***  0.3 0.2 0.44 -6.16*** 
2001 0.34 0.59 -3.18***  0.31 0.41 2.52**  0.36 0.25 0.48 -5.60*** 
2002 0.38 0.61 -2.88***  0.35 0.46 2.71***  0.4 0.28 0.54 -6.16*** 
2003 0.29 0.53 -4.83***  0.28 0.41 3.11***  0.34 0.26 0.42 -4.00*** 
2004 0.30 0.56 -5.80***  0.33 0.45 2.94***  0.39 0.27 0.5 -5.65*** 
2005 0.29 0.54 -5.75***  0.33 0.47 3.22***  0.39 0.29 0.48 -4.52*** 
2006 0.29 0.53 -5.73***  0.34 0.47 2.97***  0.4 0.29 0.49 -4.78*** 
2007 0.32 0.51 -4.56***  0.38 0.47 2.25**  0.42 0.3 0.51 -4.95*** 
 Notes: Table 2, Panels A, B  and C presents the proportion of derivatives usage for firms in high and low governance groups. Low and high GOV41, MANDATE-INDUCED, VOLUNTARY, REG10, GOV31, BOARD and COMPENSATION 
groups are defined as having values less than or equal to (greater than) the overall median index values of 19, 11, 8, 5 and 15, respectively. AFFECTED (NON-AFFECTED) is a binary variable, which is assigned a value of 1 (0) if firms 
complied with three or fewer (greater than four) of the REG10 governance mandates that were revised in the NASDAQ and NYSE listing standards in the year 2002.  Panel C also presents the proportion of derivatives usage for the full 
sample, small firms and large firms. Small (large firms) are classified as having total assets less than or equal to (greater than) the overall median asset value of $1,374.2 million for the full period 2000 to 2007.  The Wilcoxon rank sum z-
statistic presents the significance tests for the difference in median values. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. The governance variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3 Median absolute foreign exchange rate exposure  
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Year Low                GOV41 
High                
GOV41 Z-statistic   
Low                
MANDATE-
INDUCED 
High               
MANDATE-
INDUCED 
Z-statistic   Low VOLUNTARY 
High 
VOLUNTARY Z-statistic     
2000 1.35 1.497 0.8 1.4 1.179 2.10** 1.398 1.055 1.06 
2001 1.478 1.227 0.54 1.497 1.217 1.24 1.457 1.605 0.54 
2002 1.107 0.612 1.94* 1.109 0.625 2.35** 1.101 0.709 0.87 
2003 0.837 0.713 2.59*** 0.847 0.678 2.11** 0.81 0.782 1.49 
2004 0.828 0.637 3.37*** 0.741 0.67 2.37** 0.758 0.67 1.95* 
2005 1.118 0.702 2.34** 1.058 0.7 2.52** 0.832 0.7 1.92* 
2006 0.767 0.893 -0.36 0.864 0.893 -0.6 0.853 0.905 -0.25 
2007 1.248 0.985 1.85* 1.226 0.978 2.15** 1.293 0.985 1.34 
Panel B Low                REG10 
High                
REG10 Z-statistic   
Low             
GOV31 
High           
GOV31 Z-statistic   
Low           
BOARD 
High        
BOARD Z-statistic     
2000 1.396 1.294 0.95 1.343 2.161 -1.3 1.400 1.239 0.949 
2001 1.488 1.223 1.13 1.457 1.637 -0.31 1.474 1.333 1.44 
2002 1.106 0.747 1.97** 1.085 1.068 0.93 1.105 0.917 1.471 
2003 0.834 0.651 1.29 0.819 0.749 2.26** 0.771 0.804 0.379 
2004 0.715 0.675 1.32 0.806 0.654 2.67*** 0.684 0.697 1.022 
2005 0.937 0.693 2.66*** 1.029 0.685 2.25*** 1.242 0.701 2.992*** 
2006 1.048 0.891 0.24 0.905 0.891 0.27 1.135 0.874 2.142** 
2007 1.248 0.978 1.86* 1.405 0.952 2.85*** 1.195 1.009 0.83 
Panel C Low 
COMPENSATION 
High 
COMPENSATION 
Z-statistic 
  AFFECTED  NON-AFFECTED 
Z-statistic 
  
All                
Firms 
Proportion 
significant 
Small        
Firms 
Large      
firms Z-statistic 
2000 1.396 1.261 1.918  1.467 1.296 -1.56 1.394 0.05 1.678 1.211 3.18*** 
2001 1.499 1.173 1.59  1.629 1.346 -2.18**  1.458 0.07 1.668 1.225 3.39*** 
2002 1.125 0.642 2.75***  1.062 1.127 -0.07  1.085 0.08 1.201 0.992 2.64*** 
2003 0.862 0.589 3.34***  0.847 0.738 -1.54  0.803 0.09 0.966 0.688 3.29*** 
2004 0.725 0.603 2.22**  0.765 0.591 -2.90***  0.694 0.1 0.789 0.624 3.29*** 
2005 0.791 0.700 1.12  0.784 0.659 -2.26**  0.72 0.07 0.922 0.659 3.03*** 
2006 1.017 0.833 2.69***  0.987 0.792 -2.70***  0.891 0.1 1.008 0.801 3.08*** 
2007 1.125 0.939 2.20**  1.105 0.884 -2.58***  1.017 0.11 1.305 0.896 4.73*** 
Notes: Panels A, B and C of this table presents the median absolute foreign exchange rate exposure coefficients (α i2) as estimated in equation [1] for firms in high and low governance groups. Low and high GOV41, MANDATE-INDUCED, 
VOLUNTARY, REG10, GOV31, BOARD and COMPENSATION groups are defined as having values less than or equal to (greater than) the overall median index values of 19, 11, 8, 5 and 15, respectively. AFFECTED (NON-AFFECTED) is 
a binary variable, which is assigned a value of 1 (0) if firms complied with three or fewer (greater than four) of the REG10 governance mandates that were revised in the NASDAQ and NYSE listing standards in the year 2002.  
Panel C also presents the overall median exposure coefficients for the full sample and the proportion of the firms with significant exposure (at the 5 percent level or better) We also present median absolute exposure for small versus large 
firms. Small (large) firms are defined as having total assets less (greater) than the overall median value of $1,374.2 million for the period 2000 to 2007. The Wilcoxon rank sum z-statistic presents the significance tests for the difference in 
median values. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. The governance variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4 Medians for control variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
GOV41 MANDATE-INDUCED VOLUNTARY 
All firms Low  High  (3) – (2) Z-statistic   Low  High  (7) – (6) Z-statistic   Low  High  (11) – (10) Z-statistic   
Assets ($ millions) 1,374.20 890.48 2225.08 1334.60 -16.60*** 838.64 2407.33 1568.69 -18.71***  1023.19 2078.04 1054.84 -12.37***  
R&D 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.02 3.74***  0.06 0.04 -0.01 3.78***  0.05 0.04 0.00 0.86  
Quick ratio 1.41 1.51 1.32 -0.20 5.82***  1.54 1.29 -0.24 7.75***  1.44 1.38 -0.05 1.77**  
MTBV 1.74 1.69 1.81 0.12 -2.91***  1.71 1.80 0.09 -2.00**  1.69 1.82 0.13 -3.68***  
D/A 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.00 -0.02  0.21 0.22 0.01 -1.33  0.22 0.21 -0.01 1.34  
Foreign sales 16.69 13.09 21.79 8.70 -6.52***  11.81 23.82 12.01 -8.12***  15.09 18.73 3.64 -3.73***  
ABHK 4 4.00 4.00 0.00 1.29 4.00 4.00 0.00 -1.46 4.00 4.00 0.00 5.03***  
 Notes: This table reports the median values for the control variables for the all firms and high/low governance groups. Low and high GOV41, MANDATE-INDUCED and VOLUNTARY, groups are defined 
as having values less than or equal to (greater than) the overall median index values of 19, 11, and 8 respectively. The ‘z-statistic’ reports the results of a Wilcoxon rank sum test of the difference in 
medians. **denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. The control variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5 Spearman rank correlation matrix  
 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 ABSOLUTE  αi2 
2 ASSETS -0.20* 
3 R&D 0.15* -0.32* 
4 QUICK RATIO 0.16* -0.50* 0.57* 
5 MTBV -0.03 -0.04 0.28* 0.19* 
6 D/A -0.05 0.39* -0.27* -0.43* -0.27* 
8 FOREIGN SALES -0.04 0.23* 0.19* 0.00 -0.02 0.05 
9 ABHK -0.15* 0.48* -0.04 -0.31* 0.00 0.16* 0.49* 
10 DERIVATIVES USE -0.09* 0.27* -0.03 -0.25* -0.04 0.09* 0.45* 0.47* 
11 GOV41 -0.12* 0.30* -0.06† -0.14* 0.13* 0.07† 0.11* 0.17* 0.12* 
12 MANDATE-INDUCED -0.11* 0.31* -0.06† -0.17* 0.11* 0.06† 0.12* 0.21* 0.14* 0.92* 
13 VOLUNTARY -0.08* 0.19* -0.04 -0.06† 0.14* 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06† 0.81* 0.52* 
14 REG10 -0.07† 0.27* -0.11* -0.17* 0.05 0.06† 0.07† 0.17* 0.11* 0.83* 0.91* 0.45* 
15 BOARD -0.11* 0.20* -0.03 -0.09* 0.14* 0.03 0.10* 0.08* 0.08* 0.79* 0.64* 0.77* 0.46* 
16 COMPENSATION -0.13* 0.33* -0.04 -0.18* 0.10* 0.07† 0.18* 0.27* 0.23* 0.65* 0.63* 0.48* 0.47* 0.37* 
17 AFFECTED  0.14* -0.40* 0.05 0.24* -0.07† -0.13* -0.13* -0.28* -0.19* -0.18* -0.21* -0.08* -0.16* -0.11* -0.29* 
 Notes: This table presents the Spearman rank correlation matrix. The absolute foreign exchange exposure estimates αi2, are estimated via Eq.(1).  Detailed information on the 
variables can be found in the appendix. † denotes significance at 5%, and * denotes significance at the 1% level. The governance and control variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 6 Multivariate analysis: foreign exchange rate exposure 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AT -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
R&D 0.078 0.078 0.074 0.078 0.076 0.076 0.078 0.075 0.075 0.073 
 (0.138) (0.136) (0.157) (0.135) (0.149) (0.144) (0.138) (0.149) (0.149) (0.156) 
QUICK 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBV 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
DA 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.165*** 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.158*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
FOREIGN SALES 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.148) (0.158) (0.140) (0.156) (0.165) (0.137) (0.156) (0.124) (0.156) (0.133) 
ABHK 0.037* 0.038* 0.038* 0.038* 0.038* 0.038* 0.037* 0.037* 0.039* 0.038* 
 (0.086) (0.078) (0.083) (0.080) (0.082) (0.083) (0.086) (0.089) (0.072) (0.080) 
ABHK^2 -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.039) (0.043) (0.041) (0.037) (0.045) 
DERIVATIVE USE -0.028 -0.028 -0.030 -0.028 -0.031 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029 -0.028 -0.032 
 (0.206) (0.190) (0.171) (0.198) (0.158) (0.203) (0.197) (0.189) (0.191) (0.140) 
GOV41 -0.260***          
 (0.009)          
MANDATE-INDUCED  -0.204***  -0.197***       
  (0.004)  (0.007)       
VOLUNTARY   -0.101 -0.034       
   (0.259) (0.711)       
REG10     -0.123**  -0.098*    
     (0.027)  (0.090)    
GOV31      -0.202** -0.154    
      (0.033) (0.117)    
BOARD        -0.154*   
        (0.070)   
COMPENSATION         -0.103**  
         (0.040)  
AFFECTED           0.042** 
          (0.023) 
Constant 1.291*** 1.287*** 1.257*** 1.291*** 1.266*** 1.279*** 1.290*** 1.272*** 1.260*** 1.209*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Observations 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.130 0.128 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.128 0.128 0.129 
Notes: This table presents the results for the fixed effects panel regression analysis where the dependent variable is foreign exchange exposure, operationalized as the square root of the absolute 
exposure coefficient √|αi2|, with αi2, estimated in equation [1]. Year and industry dummy variables are included in the analysis. P-values are located in the parenthesis below the coefficients. ***,** and 
* indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The governance and control variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 7 Multivariate analysis: derivatives usage 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AT 0.268*** 0.278*** 0.295*** 0.268*** 0.298*** 0.281*** 0.270*** 0.302*** 0.290*** 0.322*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
R&D -1.321 -1.291 -1.311 -1.320 -1.276 -1.312 -1.315 -1.279 -1.293 -1.258 
 (0.251) (0.258) (0.259) (0.251) (0.263) (0.256) (0.251) (0.269) (0.258) (0.275) 
QUICK -0.651*** -0.627*** -0.671*** -0.649*** -0.621*** -0.663*** -0.641*** -0.661*** -0.633*** -0.639*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
MTBV -0.552** -0.532** -0.529** -0.552** -0.532** -0.528** -0.556** -0.514** -0.514** -0.486** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) 
DA -0.680 -0.679 -0.673 -0.680 -0.702 -0.661 -0.691 -0.647 -0.674 -0.663 
 (0.261) (0.263) (0.263) (0.261) (0.250) (0.270) (0.256) (0.280) (0.263) (0.270) 
FOREIGN SALES 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABHK 1.186*** 1.188*** 1.182*** 1.186*** 1.195*** 1.180*** 1.190*** 1.170*** 1.190*** 1.183*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABHK^2 -0.078** -0.078** -0.077** -0.078** -0.079** -0.077** -0.079** -0.076** -0.079** -0.077** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.027) (0.031) 
GOV41 3.055***          
 (0.002)          
MANDATE-INDUCED  1.920***  1.547**       
  (0.006)  (0.037)       
VOLUNTARY   2.212** 1.475       
   (0.020) (0.149)       
REG10     1.387***  1.102**    
     (0.008)  (0.044)    
GOV31      2.383** 1.818*    
      (0.013) (0.071)    
BOARD        1.636**   
        (0.040)   
COMPENSATION         0.986*  
         (0.053)  
AFFECTED DUMMY          -0.074 
          (0.824) 
Constant -9.164*** -9.041*** -8.935*** -9.163*** -8.956*** -9.000*** -9.170*** -8.863*** -8.782*** -8.578*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Observations 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 
Notes: This table presents the results for the random effects panel logit model. The dependent variable is the derivative usage binary variable. Year and industry dummy variables are included in the 
analysis. P-values are located in the parenthesis below the coefficients. ***,** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The governance and control variables are defined in 
the Appendix. 
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Table 8 Multivariate analysis: foreign exchange exposure and derivatives use by firm size 
 
Panel A:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Foreign exchange expo-
sure (dependent variable) 
Large  
Firms 
Small  
Firms 
Large  
Firms 
Small  
Firms 
Large 
 Firms 
Small  
Firms 
Large 
 Firms 
Small 
 Firms 
Large 
Firms 
Small 
Firms 
Large 
Firms 
Small 
Firms 
AT 0.005 -0.065*** 0.004 -0.067*** 0.001 -0.068*** 0.004 -0.068*** 0.003 -0.066*** 0.003 -0.069*** 
 (0.623) (0.005) (0.643) (0.005) (0.914) (0.003) (0.669) (0.004) (0.729) (0.004) (0.727) (0.002) 
R&D  0.060  0.057  0.058  0.056  0.059  0.056 
  (0.271)  (0.286)  (0.282)  (0.295)  (0.272)  (0.295) 
QUICK 0.102*** 0.085*** 0.095*** 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.086*** 0.098*** 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.086*** 0.101*** 0.083*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
MTBV 0.052* 0.087** 0.052* 0.085** 0.049* 0.086** 0.050* 0.083** 0.051* 0.088*** 0.049* 0.087** 
 (0.077) (0.010) (0.073) (0.012) (0.094) (0.011) (0.087) (0.014) (0.083) (0.010) (0.091) (0.011) 
DA 0.175** 0.191** 0.166** 0.192*** 0.194** 0.196*** 0.173** 0.194*** 0.184** 0.193*** 0.178** 0.192*** 
 (0.028) (0.010) (0.036) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.027) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) (0.025) (0.010) 
FOREIGN SALES 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.279) (0.498) (0.289) (0.505) (0.279) (0.492) (0.305) (0.512) (0.274) (0.482) (0.259) (0.480) 
ABHK 0.044 0.035 0.047 0.034 0.047 0.037 0.046 0.033 0.045 0.037 0.048* 0.030 
 (0.131) (0.309) (0.109) (0.327) (0.105) (0.283) (0.110) (0.332) (0.125) (0.284) (0.098) (0.379) 
ABHK^2 -0.006* -0.004 -0.006* -0.004 -0.006* -0.005 -0.006* -0.004 -0.006* -0.005 -0.006* -0.004 
 (0.086) (0.319) (0.074) (0.347) (0.067) (0.285) (0.074) (0.354) (0.081) (0.286) (0.070) (0.414) 
DERIVATIVE USE -0.045 0.003 -0.044 -0.001 -0.048* 0.005 -0.046* -0.002 -0.046* 0.005 -0.047* -0.003 
 (0.100) (0.939) (0.107) (0.976) (0.082) (0.891) (0.096) (0.946) (0.092) (0.882) (0.084) (0.932) 
GOV41 -0.195 -0.251*           
 (0.146) (0.094)           
MANDATE-INDUCED   -0.246*** -0.084         
   (0.008) (0.441)         
VOLUNTARY     0.075 -0.290**       
     (0.531) (0.032)       
REG10       -0.166** -0.031     
       (0.025) (0.723)     
GOV31         -0.080 -0.279*   
         (0.531) (0.050)   
AFFECTED            0.042* 0.042 
           (0.070) (0.161) 
Constant 1.039*** 1.578*** 1.078*** 1.548*** 0.972*** 1.595*** 1.040*** 1.540*** 1.006*** 1.590*** 0.956*** 1.514*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Observations 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.117 0.113 0.116 0.110 0.118 0.112 0.116 0.110 0.117 0.111 0.117 
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Panel B: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Derivatives use 
(dependent variable) 
Large  
Firms 
Small  
Firms 
Large  
Firms
Small  
Firms
Large 
 Firms
Small  
Firms
Large 
 Firms 
Small 
 Firms
Large 
 Firms
Small 
 Firms
Large  
Firms
Small  
Firms
AT 0.063 0.472 0.073 0.489 0.079 0.510 0.076 0.532 0.075 0.471 0.088 0.555* 
 (0.627) (0.153) (0.574) (0.140) (0.543) (0.119) (0.562) (0.108) (0.567) (0.151) (0.498) (0.089) 
R&D  -1.503  -1.454  -1.508  -1.426  -1.504  -1.393 
  (0.297)  (0.312)  (0.302)  (0.324)  (0.298)  (0.336) 
QUICK -0.483 -0.841*** -0.457 -0.812** -0.501 -0.877*** -0.463 -0.798** -0.493 -0.866*** -0.483 -0.816** 
 (0.150) (0.008) (0.174) (0.011) (0.135) (0.006) (0.169) (0.013) (0.141) (0.007) (0.150) (0.010) 
MTBV -0.332 -0.860** -0.327 -0.802** -0.318 -0.858** -0.330 -0.786** -0.321 -0.843** -0.309 -0.728** 
 (0.246) (0.020) (0.253) (0.028) (0.265) (0.020) (0.252) (0.032) (0.261) (0.021) (0.280) (0.044) 
DA -1.018 -0.760 -1.054 -0.710 -1.059 -0.782 -1.093 -0.729 -1.036 -0.730 -1.086 -0.678 
 (0.229) (0.432) (0.215) (0.462) (0.209) (0.418) (0.200) (0.452) (0.219) (0.447) (0.200) (0.481) 
FOREIGN SALES 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.044*** 0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABHK 0.861** 1.522** 0.851** 1.573*** 0.838** 1.525** 0.833** 1.638*** 0.850** 1.490** 0.822** 1.634*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.006) 
ABHK^2 -0.060 -0.062 -0.059 -0.067 -0.057 -0.063 -0.057 -0.075 -0.058 -0.058 -0.055 -0.074 
 (0.135) (0.388) (0.141) (0.351) (0.155) (0.377) (0.155) (0.299) (0.145) (0.416) (0.166) (0.302) 
GOV41 2.265* 3.771**           
 (0.084) (0.022)           
MANDATE-INDUCED   1.593* 1.897         
   (0.072) (0.118)         
VOLUNTARY     0.960 4.072**       
     (0.440) (0.012)       
REG10       1.203* 1.225     
       (0.072) (0.182)     
GOV31         1.418 3.631**   
         (0.267) (0.025)   
AFFECTED           -0.127 -0.004 
           (0.722) (0.995) 
Constant -5.957*** -14.046*** -5.942*** -13.832*** -5.507*** -14.186*** -5.720*** -14.007*** -5.707*** -13.882*** -5.245*** -13.751*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
             
Observations 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 1,864 1,510 
Notes: A presents the results for the fixed effects panel regression analysis where the dependent variable is foreign exchange exposure, operationalised as the square root of the absolute exposure coefficient 
√|αi2|, with αi2, estimated in equation [1]. Panel B of this table presents the results for the random effects panel logit regression analysis where DERIVATIVES USE is the dependent variable. Panel Small 
(large) firms are defined as having total assets less (greater) than the overall median value of $1,374.2 million for the period 2000 to 2007. Year and industry dummy variables are included in the analysis. P-
values are located in the parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 9 Time trend analysis 
 
Panel A: Foreign exchange exposure 
(dependent variable) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AT -0.013** -0.015** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.015** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (0.043) (0.025) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.003) (0.007) 
R&D 0.086 0.086 0.079 0.081 0.084 0.082 0.079 
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.125) (0.128) (0.106) (0.109) (0.130) 
QUICK 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.098*** 0.085*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.089*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBV 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DA 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.170*** 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.159*** 0.173*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
FOREIGN SALES 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.268) (0.342) (0.299) (0.478) (0.258) (0.206) (0.470) 
ABHK 0.049** 0.056** 0.054** 0.060*** 0.053** 0.053** 0.071*** 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.014) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.001) 
ABHK^2 -0.006** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) 
DERIVATIVE USE -0.023 -0.026 -0.026 -0.033 -0.022 -0.024 -0.026 
 (0.283) (0.231) (0.237) (0.138) (0.305) (0.279) (0.241) 
GOV41 -0.368***       
 (0.000)       
GOV41*2002 -0.358***       
 (0.000)       
GOV41*2003 -0.562***       
 (0.000)       
GOV41*2004 -0.585***       
 (0.000)       
GOV41*2005 -0.338***       
 (0.000)       
GOV41*2006 -0.223***       
 (0.000)       
MANDATE-INDUCED   -0.255***      
  (0.000)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *02  -0.271***      
  (0.001)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *03  -0.505***      
  (0.000)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *04  -0.494***      
  (0.000)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *05  -0.261***      
  (0.000)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *06  -0.183***      
  (0.000)      
VOLUNTARY   -0.198**     
   (0.013)     
VOLUNTARY *02   -0.288**     
   (0.019)     
VOLUNTARY *03   -0.584***     
   (0.000)     
VOLUNTARY *04   -0.682***     
   (0.000)     
VOLUNTARY *05   -0.487***     
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   (0.000)     
VOLUNTARY *06   -0.311***     
   (0.000)     
REG10    -0.126***    
    (0.006)    
REG10*2002    -0.216**    
    (0.012)    
REG10*2003    -0.545***    
    (0.000)    
REG10*2004    -0.577***    
    (0.000)    
REG10*2005    -0.255***    
    (0.000)    
REG10*2006    -0.159***    
    (0.000)    
GOV31     -0.312***   
     (0.000)   
GOV31*2002     -0.318***   
     (0.002)   
GOV31*2003     -0.520***   
     (0.000)   
GOV31*2004     -0.557***   
     (0.000)   
GOV31*2005     -0.401***   
     (0.000)   
GOV31*2006     -0.282***   
     (0.000)   
BOARD      -0.239***  
      (0.002)  
BOARD *2002      -0.330***  
      (0.005)  
BOARD *2003      -0.507***  
      (0.000)  
BOARD *2004      -0.532***  
      (0.000)  
BOARD *2005      -0.402***  
      (0.000)  
BOARD *2006      -0.302***  
      (0.000)  
COMPENSATION       -0.049 
       (0.345) 
COMPENSATION *2002       -0.180** 
       (0.011) 
COMPENSATION *2003       -0.462*** 
       (0.000) 
COMPENSATION *2004       -0.493*** 
       (0.000) 
COMPENSATION *2005       -0.351*** 
       (0.000) 
COMPENSATION *2006       -0.245*** 
       (0.000) 
Constant 1.228*** 1.191*** 1.151*** 1.134*** 1.193*** 1.184*** 1.063*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.118 0.112 0.109 0.117 0.115 0.107 
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Panel B: Derivatives use  
(dependent variable) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AT 0.276*** 0.284*** 0.296*** 0.301*** 0.284*** 0.306*** 0.304*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
R&D -1.312 -1.290 -1.316 -1.270 -1.315 -1.282 -1.289 
 (0.258) (0.263) (0.261) (0.269) (0.259) (0.271) (0.260) 
QUICK -0.616*** -0.599*** -0.630*** -0.589*** -0.628*** -0.626*** -0.599*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
MTBV -0.585*** -0.589*** -0.591*** -0.598*** -0.586*** -0.589*** -0.604*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
DA -0.584 -0.631 -0.609 -0.669 -0.606 -0.617 -0.728 
 (0.327) (0.292) (0.306) (0.266) (0.308) (0.298) (0.223) 
FOREIGN SALES 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABHK 1.181*** 1.173*** 1.165*** 1.170*** 1.164*** 1.147*** 1.142*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABHK^2 -0.077** -0.076** -0.075** -0.076** -0.075** -0.073** -0.074** 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.039) (0.037) 
GOV41 2.101***       
 (0.000)       
GOV41*2002 1.983***       
 (0.002)       
GOV41*2003 -0.629       
 (0.135)       
GOV41*2004 -0.017       
 (0.967)       
GOV41*2005 -0.216       
 (0.548)       
GOV41*2006 -0.309       
 (0.386)       
MANDATE-INDUCED   1.658***      
  (0.001)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *02  1.542***      
  (0.003)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *03  -0.408      
  (0.272)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *04  0.006      
  (0.987)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *05  -0.256      
  (0.392)      
MANDATE-INDUCED *06  -0.323      
  (0.278)      
VOLUNTARY   1.961***     
   (0.002)     
VOLUNTARY *02   2.146***     
   (0.005)     
VOLUNTARY *03   -0.941**     
   (0.048)     
VOLUNTARY *04   -0.038     
   (0.935)     
VOLUNTARY *05   0.008     
   (0.985)     
VOLUNTARY *06   -0.131     
   (0.760)     
REG10    1.137***    
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    (0.001)    
REG10*2002    1.587***    
    (0.005)    
REG10*2003    -0.193    
    (0.652)    
REG10*2004    0.204    
    (0.605)    
REG10*2005    -0.178    
    (0.520)    
REG10*2006    -0.297    
    (0.271)    
GOV31     2.177***   
     (0.001)   
GOV31*2002     1.876***   
     (0.003)   
GOV31*2003     -0.857**   
     (0.042)   
GOV31*2004     -0.175   
     (0.665)   
GOV31*2005     -0.147   
     (0.707)   
GOV31*2006     -0.206   
     (0.598)   
BOARD      1.703***  
      (0.004)  
BOARD *2002      1.893***  
      (0.008)  
BOARD *2003      -0.844*  
      (0.050)  
BOARD *2004      -0.242  
      (0.552)  
BOARD *2005      -0.132  
      (0.742)  
BOARD *2006      -0.152  
      (0.710)  
COMPENSATION       1.168** 
       (0.011) 
COMPENSATION *2002       1.117** 
       (0.011) 
COMPENSATION *2003       -0.534 
       (0.130) 
COMPENSATION *2004       0.135 
       (0.683) 
COMPENSATION *2005       0.055 
       (0.859) 
COMPENSATION *2006       -0.068 
       (0.823) 
Constant -8.631*** -8.617*** -8.505*** -8.459*** -8.611*** -8.496*** -8.410*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 3,374 
Notes: Panel A of this table presents the results for the fixed effects panel regression analysis where the dependent variable is foreign exchange exposure, operationalised as the square root of the absolute exposure coefficient √|αi2|, with αi2, 
estimated in equation [1].  Panel B presents the findings of panel random effects logit regression analysis in which the dependent variable is the DERIVATIVES USE binary variable. We include the time trend interaction terms, whereby the GOV41, 
MANDATE-INDUCED, VOLUNTARY, REG10 and GOV31, BOARD and COMPENSATION indexes are interacted with year dummies. Industry dummies are included in the analysis. P-values are in parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, ** and * 
indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The governance and control variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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Table 10 Dynamic panel GMM 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AT 0.161*** 0.139** 0.118** 0.048 0.161*** 0.131*** 0.078 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.025) (0.415) (0.002) (0.007) (0.145) 
R&D 0.277*** 0.280*** 0.268*** 0.267*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.268*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
QUICK 0.011 0.015 0.024 0.038 0.014 0.021 0.034 
 (0.861) (0.809) (0.697) (0.550) (0.817) (0.726) (0.586) 
MTBV 0.104 0.098 0.089 0.063 0.117* 0.114* 0.072 
 (0.138) (0.166) (0.204) (0.374) (0.090) (0.099) (0.310) 
DA -0.064 -0.060 -0.031 -0.002 -0.066 -0.060 -0.006 
 (0.773) (0.787) (0.889) (0.994) (0.759) (0.781) (0.980) 
FOREIGN SALES -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.359) (0.284) (0.273) (0.127) (0.500) (0.445) (0.180) 
ABHK 0.083 0.088 0.077 0.086 0.068 0.071 0.082 
 (0.301) (0.272) (0.349) (0.305) (0.392) (0.375) (0.324) 
ABHK^2 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.253) (0.228) (0.280) (0.237) (0.321) (0.300) (0.260) 
DERIVATIVES USE -0.054 -0.053 -0.058 -0.056 -0.058 -0.057 -0.057 
 (0.196) (0.212) (0.173) (0.194) (0.168) (0.172) (0.188) 
GOV41 -0.624***       
 (0.000)       
MANDATE-INDUCED  -0.420***      
  (0.000)      
VOLUNTARY   -0.540***     
   (0.000)     
REG10    -0.049    
    (0.479)    
GOV31     -0.904***   
     (0.000)   
BOARD      -0.736***  
      (0.000)  
COMPENSATION       -0.239** 
       (0.020) 
Constant -0.122 -0.029 0.122 0.443 0.022 0.152 0.321 
 (0.776) (0.947) (0.767) (0.335) (0.956) (0.701) (0.446) 
        
Observations 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537 
Notes: This table presents the results for the dynamic panel GMM analysis. The dependent variable is the square root of the absolute exposure coefficient √|αi2|, with αi2 estimated in equation [1]. P-
values are in parenthesis below the coefficients. Year dummies are included the analysis. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The governance and control 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Appendix:  Variables used in the panel analysis 
 
Dependent variables 
Derivative Use 
The binary variable takes a value of one if the firm uses foreign currency derivatives and zero otherwise.  The data were collected 
from item 7a “quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market risk” in the firm’s annual 10-K report filed with the SEC. 
 
√|αi2| Square root of the absolute exposure coefficient 
We take the absolute value of the foreign exchange exposure response coefficient αi2 estimated via equation [1], and then, to avoid 
truncation bias, we take its square root. 
 
Governance variables 
Aggarwal, Schloetzer and Williamson’s (2016) 41 ‘good’ governance attributes. Aggarwal, Schloetzer and Williamson (2016) identify 
the following 41 firm-level ‘good’ governance practices, under four categories; those relating to board, audit, anti-takeover 
provisions, and compensation and ownership. * denotes the REG10 index attributes was mandated in revised stock exchange listing 
standards. † denotes the MANDATE-INDUCED index attributes.  
 
Board 
1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse  
2. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies  
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors * † 
4. Board size is at greater than five but less than sixteen † 
5. CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction  
6. Compensation committee composed solely of independent outsiders *† 
7. Chairman and CEO positions are separated, or there is a lead director  
8. Nominating committee composed solely of independent outsiders *† 
9. Governance committee exists and met in the past year † 
10. Shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies  
11. Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed *†  
12. Annually elected board (no staggered board) † 
13. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit) †  
			
	 A2
14. Shareholders have cumulative voting rights  
15. Shareholder approval is required to increase/decrease board size  
16. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority)  
17. Board has the express authority to hire its own advisers†  
18. Performance of the board is reviewed regularly *†  
19. Board-approved succession plan in place for the CEO *†  
20. Outside directors meet without CEO and disclose number of times met *†  
21. Directors are required to submit resignation upon a change in job  
22. Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can do so under limited circumstances  
23. Does not ignore shareholder proposal  
24. Qualifies for proxy contest defenses combination points  
Audit committee  
25. Consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors *† 
26. Audit committee composed solely of independent outsiders *†  
27. Auditors ratified at most recent annual meeting † 
Anti-Takeover provisions  
28. Single class, common  
29. Majority vote requirement to approve mergers (not supermajority)  
30. Shareholders may call special meetings  
31. Shareholders may act by written consent  
32. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that is shareholder approved.  
33. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred stock  
Compensation and ownership  
34. Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements†  
35. Officers are subject to stock ownership guidelines†  
36. No interlocks among compensation committee members†  
37. Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock†  
38. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval *†  
39. Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate  
40. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1% but not over 30% of total shares outstanding  
41. Repricing prohibited 
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GOV41 is a composite index of the 41 attributes in the table above. A value of one is assigned if the firm meets minimally acceptable 
guidelines on that attribute, and zero otherwise. The index is expressed as a percentage. 
MANDATE-INDUCED is a composite index of the 20 attributes denoted by the † symbol in the table above. These 20 attributes 
include the 10 mandatory attributes in REG10 plus 10 more that are so closely associated with the legal requirements in REG10 that a 
joint introduction is likely, as the very high correlation with REG10 shows. A value of one is assigned to each attribute if the firm 
meets minimally acceptable guidelines on that attribute, and zero otherwise. The index is expressed as a percentage. 
VOLUNTARY is a composite index of the 41 attributes in the table above minus the 20 attributes that comprise the MANDATE-
INDUCED index (as denoted by the † symbol) in the table above. A value of one is assigned to each attribute if the firm meets 
minimally acceptable guidelines on that attribute, and zero otherwise. The index is expressed as a percentage. 
REG10 is a composite index of ten attributes that were mandated in the revised stock exchange listing standards denoted by the 
asterisk * in the table above. A value of one is assigned to each attribute if the firm meets minimally acceptable guidelines on that 
attribute, and zero otherwise. The index is expressed as a percentage.  
GOV31 is a composite index of the 41 attributes in the table above minus the 10 attributes that comprise REG10 (as denoted by the 
asterisk *). A value of one is assigned if the firm meets minimally acceptable guidelines on that attribute, and zero otherwise. The 
index is expressed as a percentage. 
BOARD is a composite index of the attributes numbed 1-24 in the table above minus the attributes that are included in REG10 (as 
denoted by the asterisk *). A value of one is assigned if the firm meets minimally acceptable guidelines on that attribute, and zero 
otherwise. The index is expressed as a percentage. 
COMPENSATION is a composite index of the attributes numbed 34-41 in the table above minus the attributes included in REG10 (as 
denoted by the asterisk *).  A value of one is assigned if the firm meets minimally acceptable guidelines on that attribute, and zero 
otherwise. The index is expressed as a percentage. 
AFFECTED DUMMY is a binary variable, which is assigned a value of 1 if firms complied with three or fewer of the REG10 
governance mandates that were revised in the NASDAQ and NYSE listing standards in the year 2002, 0 otherwise.  
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Control variables  
Foreign sales  
Foreign sales is the International Sales / Net Sales or Revenues * 100. 
 
D/A  
Debt-to-assets ratio is long-term total debt divided by total assets.  
 
MTBV  
Market-to-book value ratio is defined as the market value of the ordinary (common) equity divided by the balance sheet value of the 
ordinary (common) equity.  
 
Quick   
Quick ratio (also referred to as the liquidity ratio) is defined as (Cash & Equivalents + Receivables (Net)) / Current Liabilities-Total.  
 
R&D  
R&D expense is research and development expenses / net sales or revenues * 100.   
 
Assets 
Total assets is the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net 
property plant and equipment and other assets. 
 
Industry   
Using the two-digit standard industry classification codes we create industry dummies that take the value of 1 if the firm is in an 
industry category and 0 otherwise. We removed financial, insurance and real estate firms that which had two digit codes in the range 
60 to 67.  
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Multinationality: the ABHK Scheme 
The ABHK multinationality classification system divides the world into six regions based on the inhabited continents: Africa, Asia, 
Europe, North America (including Central America), South America, and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific islands). A 
firm is considered to have a presence in a particular region if it has at least one subsidiary there. The ABHK scheme index ranges in 
value from one to seven. A firm with activities entirely within the United States is defined as domestic (D) and is assigned a value of 
one in the index. A firm activities in the region of North and Central America is classified as regional (R), and is assigned a value of 
two in the index.  If a firm has activities in two regions (T2), it is assigned a value of three, three regions (T3) is assigned a value of 
four, four regions (T4) is assigned a value of five and five regions (T5) is assigned a value of six.  A firm is classified as ‘global’ (G) if 
it has activities in all six regions and is assigned a value of seven in the index.  The data were collected from the Directory of 
Corporate Affiliates via Lexis Nexis.   
 
Number of foreign subsidiaries 
Number of foreign subsidiaries is the total number of the firm’s foreign subsidies. The data on subsidiary location were collected from 
the Directory of Corporate Affiliates via Lexis Nexis. 
 
 
